How profitable were foreign investments in plantation agriculture in the 10 Netherlands Indies during the late colonial era? We use a new dataset of monthly 11 quoted stock prices and dividends of international companies at the Brussels stock 12 exchange to estimate the returns to investment in tropical agriculture (1919)(1920)(1921)(1922)(1923)(1924)(1925)(1926)(1927)(1928)(1929)(1930)(1931)(1932)(1933)(1934)(1935)(1936)(1937)(1938). 13 We adopt the Dimson-March-Staunton method to compute real geometric annual 14 average rates of return and assess our estimates in an international comparative 15 perspective. We find that returns to colonial FDI in the Netherlands Indies during 16 1919-1928 were impressive (14.3 %), being almost 3 percentage points higher than 17 the world average. In the following decade 1929-1938 fortunes reversed, with a rate 18 of return of -2.8 % compared to a world average of 2.2 %. Over the entire period 19 the returns to colonial FDI (5.4 % in 1919FDI (5.4 % in -1938 were about a factor 2.5 higher than 20 returns to investment in the Dutch domestic economy (2.1 % in 1920-1939). We 21 argue that these returns should be interpreted in a colonial context of systematic 22 labour repression, but that they may also partly reflect a higher risk-premium of 23 investments in colonial commodities. 24 25 Keywords FDI Á Netherlands Indies Á Colonial economy Á Tropical agriculture Á 26 Returns to investment 27 28 JEL Classification N25 Á N45 Á N55 29 30 A1 & Ewout Frankema A2 ewout.frankema@wur.nl A3
1FL01
1 In this period virtually all Dutch assets were nationalized with the exception of Shell and Unilever as 1FL02 they were of mixed Anglo-Dutch ownership (Sluyterman 2004, 5) .
2FL01 2 The profits of the cultivation system inspired the title of a publication by Sandberg (1914) ''Indië 2FL02 verloren, rampspoed geboren'' (the loss of the East Indies will give birth to disaster). This expression is 2FL03 still in vogue. See Glissenaar (2003) .
3FL01
3 See for an example of repeated reference to Tinbergen and Derksen's study Nobel and Fennema (1996, 3FL02 15 ). See for a critical discussion of Derksen and Tinbergen the work of Gorter (1964) 156 the oil industry, thanks to their colonial possessions. The contribution of the 157 Netherlands Indies to the Dutch dollar surplus during the interwar years, thanks to 158 the large Indonesian rubber exports to the US, was also considered to be of great 159 importance (Booth 1996, 402; Baudet 1980 Baudet [1975 , 243-244). 4 Julius Boeke 160 (1940a, b) characterised Dutch colonial policies in terms of a 'drain' that 161 systematically depleted Indonesian resources and impoverished the indigenous 162 population. According to Maddison (1990, 367 ; see also Maddison 1989) this drain 163 became manifest in a vast export surplus of 12.4 % of GDP in the period 164 1913-1938, which was much higher than in any other Asian country. 165 Even though all these figures may have captured part of a historical economic 166 reality, the forecasts all proved wrong. The Dutch economy did not suffer nearly as 167 much as contemporary observers had expected, neither after 1949, nor after 1957 168 (Baudet and Fennema 1983) . By the late 1940s, the Dutch economy stood at the 169 verge of entering a 'golden age' of economic growth, during which the loss of 170 colonial assets after 1957 was easily overcome. 171 This puzzle has continued to invite debate on the magnitude of the colonial drain 172 and its wider implications (Kuitenbrouwer 1991) . van der Eng (1998a, b) discussed 173 the Hobson-Lenin thesis of colonial exploitation arguing that, in a broader 174 comparative perspective, the returns to Dutch FDI in Indonesia were not terribly 175 high compared to the returns on investment in Dutch domestic sectors or compared 176 to other foreign investments. According to van der Eng, the evidence for excessive 177 rent extraction in the late colonial era is weak. Alec Gordon (2010) has argued that 178 previous studies were all wrong to focus exclusively on trade data, and proposed the 179 use of much more detailed balance of payments data to estimate the colonial 180 surplus, which he found to be large by all standards, some 24 billion guilders over 181 the entire period of 1878-1939, equivalent to ca. 156 billion US $ in 2010 constant 182 values (Gordon 2010, 425 and 440). 183 3 Colonial FDI: policies and practices 184 Colonial FDI may be regarded as a special type of FDI because the degree of 185 colonial control over institutional arrangements and factor markets may raise the 186 profit potential of foreign investment. One of the motives for metropolitan investors 187 to build up positions in the colonial economy was the implicit assumption that they 188 could obtain higher rates of returns than elsewhere. This, in turn, would also explain 189 part of the economic and political rationale of colonization: why would one bear the 190 costs of controlling overseas territories if it would not enhance opportunities of rent 191 creation and rent extraction? Although some scholars have argued that colonization 192 made little difference for the profitability of investment (Fieldhouse 1961; 4FL01 4 The Dutch also strongly felt that their colonial rule was exceptional: ''Contemporary Dutch reaction to 4FL02 other nations' imperialism was often one of disgust and moral condemnation. What the French did in 4FL03
Indochina, let alone the British in South Africa, was something fundamentally different from the reluctant 4FL04 assumption by the Dutch of their responsibilities towards the indigenous peoples of the Indonesian 4FL05 archipelago.'' (Lindblad 1989, 2 As we will see below, European investors in plantation agriculture in the 282 Netherlands Indies indeed obtained a decent profit. To be sure, part of this was 283 facilitated by the interventions of the Dutch colonial state in the markets for land 284 and labour. However, it would be too easy to conclude that this all stemmed from 285 colonial coercion. The rates of return to colonial FDI may also have signalled a 286 substantially higher risk-premium for two reasons that we will elaborate further 287 below: the volatile nature of primary commodity markets and the loss of 288 investments due to the long-term instability of the colonial project. While the risk 289 of independence revolts may not have guided investor's decisions in the 1920s, it is 290 clear that investors stood at a large distance, and that information asymmetries 291 between the firms operating in Indonesia and the suppliers of capital, were high. The 292 risk of instant capital evaporation turned into reality in the 1940s and 1950s.
4 Returns to FDI in the Netherlands Indies: methods and estimates
294 The data and methods that have been used in previous estimates of returns to FDI in 295 the Netherlands Indies after 1900 all suffer from major flaws. A first category of 296 studies has computed the ratio of total annual dividend payments to the total stock 297 of FDI. The most famous example is the study by Derksen and Tinbergen (1980 298 [1945] , 226). For the year 1938, which they hold to be a 'normal' year, they 299 estimated a total amount of dividend and interest payments of 155 million guilders, 300 on a Dutch FDI stock of 3.975 billion, translating into a return on investment of 301 3.9 % (see also Baudet 1980 Baudet [1975 , 252). van der Zwaag (1991, 79) has offered 302 additional estimates for 1900-1912 (6.5 %); for 1922-1929 (7 %) and for 1930 303 (3.2 %) showing that the Derksen-Tinbergen figure was a lower-bound figure, but 304 he does not explain how he obtained his estimates. Haccoû (1961 [1984] , 263) 305 reports an annual average of 6.7 % for the period 1924-1939. Weijers (1941, 306 305-306) reports a guesstimate of 6-7 % without defining the period. 307
Apart from a lack of transparency on the data and estimation methods, the idea of 308 taking dividends over total FDI itself is highly problematic, because estimates of 309 total FDI stock are flawed. Whereas dividend and interest payments constitute an 310 annual flow which have been recorded in the annual balance of payments reports, 311 the measurement of FDI stock requires an estimation methodology that takes 312 accumulation and depreciation over time into account. van der Eng (1998a, 14-24) 313 has pointed out that the neglect of profits being ploughed back into FDI stock has 314 led to seriously underestimated denominators. He suggests that the observed inflow 315 of private capital was only about one-third of the total replacement value of 316 Indonesian FDI. Taking re-invested profits into account, van der Eng has re-317 estimated the ratios of dividend income to total FDI as well as the ratio of remitted 318 dividends, profits and interest payments to total FDI. He reports for the dividend/ 319 FDI ratio 6.6 % (1922), 2.8 % (1930), 6.8 % (1937) and for the remitted income/ However, there are several major flaws in this procedure. Since stock prices tend 335 to be volatile, a single price quotation is unlikely to reflect the actual value of a 336 company very well. Moreover, whenever companies re-invest profits instead of 337 paying dividend, the increased value of the company will be absorbed in the stock 338 price. Hence, a proper estimate of returns to investment over a given period of time 339 should always include capital gains ánd capital losses. To justify the assumption that 340 stock prices reflect the 'real' value of FDI, one has to work with a moving average 341 share price based on a time-series of price quotations, instead of a single initial price 342 observation. Moreover, by calculating annual dividend over the initial nominal 343 stock values, Bosch' estimates fail to take the effects of inflation into account. One 344 could argue that in the period up to 1914, modest inflation rates may not have driven 345 a large wedge between initial stock prices and real-time deflated prices, but for the 346 interwar era it will give highly overestimated rates of return. Bosch (1948, 97) was 347 well aware of these shortcomings, including the fact that he applied no weighting 348 scheme for companies, and invited scholars to make more precise calculations. 349
A third category of studies takes the ratio of dividends over some type of 350 temporal average of stock values. The underlying idea is that stock prices absorb 351 relevant market information and hence reflect the actual value of invested capital, 352 that is, the present value of all expected future cash flows, with a greater degree of 353 accuracy than estimates of total FDI stock. 8 The estimates offered in the report of 354 the Keyser & Zonen Bank (1937), a source that Gordon (2010) uses for his 355 calculations of total colonial surplus-but fails to discuss in detail, are based on a 356 selection of the 60 best performing stocks at the Amsterdam stock exchange, which 357 is understandable for a banker who wants to sell stocks, but introduces selection bias 358 for historians interested in average rates of return. Keyser & Zonen have split their 359 sample into various sectors of the colonial economy as shown in Table 1. 8FL01 8 There is a huge literature on how information translates into prices. One can distinguish three versions 8FL02 of the so-called ''efficient market hypothesis'': weak, semi-strong and strong. The first (''weak'') states 8FL03
that all past publicly available information is reflected in prices, the second (''semi-strong'') asserts 8FL04 moreover that prices immediately react to any new public available information, and the third version 8FL05 (''strong'') states that prices even respond to hidden information (Brocquet et al. 1997, 245) . 
360
The real rates of return reported by Keyser & Zonen are based on the arithmetic 361 averages of dividend payments divided by the arithmetic averages of the highest and 362 the lowest stock price quotation in the selected periods. This gives a more reliable 363 result than taking initial nominal share values, but it remains a fairly weak proxy 364 since the peaks and troughs caused by serious market shocks, are unlikely to reflect 365 the average price trend. The more fundamental problem, however, is the exclusion 366 of capital gains and losses. The estimates of Keyser & Zonen, and hence the figures 367 reported by Gordon (2010), are seriously flawed because the applied method does 368 not allow for capital losses. Consider the following simple example: suppose we 369 compute the arithmetic average of stock X with a bottom price of 200 guilders at t 0 370 and a peak price of 400 guilders at t 1 , whereas stock Y peaks at 400 at t 0 and ends 371 with 200 at t 1 . Both stocks paid a dividend of 30 guilders. In this case the estimated 372 rate of return will be the same for both stocks, namely 10 %. However, in reality 373 stock X yields a return of 10 % plus a capital gain of 100 %, while stock Y yields a 374 return of 10 % and a capital loss of 50 %! Indeed, with this method one can never 375 incur a negative rate of return (see Table 1 ). Moreover, the ''real'' returns presented 376 by Keyser & Zonen are not ''real'' in the usual economic sense. They have not been 377 adjusted for inflation, a fact entirely overlooked by Gordon (2010). ). All the data were obtained from the official quotation lists and 387 checked in secondary sources, primarily the so-called Recueil Financier. 9 This 388 dataset is unique in terms of its coverage (all traded stocks), its detail (monthly 389 prices) and its accuracy (cross-checking with secondary sources). In fact, digitized 390 official price lists of stock exchanges, including, unfortunately, the Amsterdam 391 stock exchange (AEX), are virtually non-existent. 392
From the SCOB database we have derived 17 international companies that had 393 concentrated their investments primarily or exclusively in the production of tropical 394 agricultural commodities in the Netherlands Indies (see ''Appendix'' for the 395 companies included). Brussels was a major centre for international stock trading in 396 the late 19th and early 20th century, mediating an impressive amount of FDI in all 397 corners of the world, from China to Argentina and from Brazil to Egypt. Stocks of 398 foreign companies based in the Netherlands Indies became listed at the BSE from 399 1913 onwards. The Soengei Lipoet Cultuur Maatschappij was the first, but in due 400 time several others were listed. 401
Although the 17 companies in our sample vary in size and in type of plantation 402 production and commercial activity, we cannot take full 'representativeness' for 403 granted. The sample is likely to be sufficiently large and diverse to offer a proxy of 404 the foreign business performance in Indonesian tropical agriculture, but the sample 405 is small compared to the 138 companies listed at the Amsterdam stock exchange in 406 1938, and they are just a fraction of the ca. 2850 companies that were active in the 407 Netherlands Indies in 1930 (Lindblad 1993, 703) . Our sample includes companies 408 that invested in tropical agricultural commodities such as rubber, palm oil, coffee, 409 cocoa and tea. The majority of companies had a portfolio dominated by palm oil and 410 even more so by rubber. In a way this is good news, because these two crops were 411 by far the two most important products of the plantation sector. We have excluded 412 FDI in tin (e.g. Billiton) and oil (Royal Dutch) because these companies were not 413 listed at the BSE (Royal Dutch only from 1928 onwards) and operated on a global 414 scale. A considerable part of the companies in our sample were linked to a few 415 Belgian-French investment groups, most notably Bunge and Hallet/Rivaud, 10 who 416 also invested part of their capital in plantation agriculture in the Belgian Congo, but 417 via different subsidiaries. 11 418
Due to their domestic reputation in Belgium these firms were able to tap into the 419 Belgian capital market. They had direct links with the Belgian royal family and were 420 regarded as first class investors, with great 'expertise' in colonial enterprise. For 421 example, Adrien Hallet We can also compare our sample to the colonial companies listed at the AEX, by 437 using the lists provided by van der Zwaag (1991, 304-310). This shows that 85.5 % 438 of the companies was engaged in tropical agriculture, 7.1 % in trade and 4.6 % in 439 oil and other types of mining. Unfortunately, van der Zwaag's lists do not allow us 440 to sub-divide tropical agriculture, since many companies entered under the general 441 name of ''cultuurmaatschappij''. Using only the companies that had a clearly 442 specified name, suggests that Dutch firms were active in a wider range of products, 443 including rubber, coffee, forestry, sugar, tea, kina, rice, tobacco and palm oil. That 444 said, rubber and palm oil were by far the biggest cash-crops in Indonesian exports 445 and have arguably driven profits of Dutch colonial companies to a very large extent, 446 as they did with the profits of the companies in our sample. 447
Since the BSE was closed during the German occupation of Belgium in 448 1914-1918, complete and consistent price lists for our sample are only available 449 from 1919 onwards. This motivates the starting year of our analysis. During the 450 German occupation of Belgium in the Second World War, Netherlands Indies stocks 451 were not listed from the 10th of May 1940 to the end of August 1942. Thereafter 452 only part of the sample was listed again and we use this reduced sample to extend 453 our estimates into the war years and the post-colonial era up to 1958, but for 454 consistency purposes we focus our interpretation on the period 1919-1938. 12 455 5.2 Method 456 The advantage of using consistent series of monthly price observations is that it 457 allows us to compute real rates of return to foreign investment in tropical 458 agriculture in the Netherlands Indies with a much greater degree of precision than 459 previous studies have done. Following the Dimson-Marsh-Staunton (DMS) 460 method, which is the current standard for international comparisons of investment 461 returns (Caporin et al. 2013, 1-26), we calculated the geometric annual average rate 462 of return on colonial company stocks. We deflated these estimates using the official 12FL01 12 On 31/8/1942 the following stocks were listed again: Huileries de Sumatra (action de capital), 12FL02 Huileries de Sumatra (part de fondateur), Plantations de Johore (action de capital), Plantations de Johore 12FL03 (part de fondateur), Nord de Sumatra (action de capital), Nord de Sumatra (part de fondateur). Others 12FL04 (like Société des Plantations de Telok-Dalam) would be listed only in 1945 or even in 1947 again (like 12FL05 Soengei Lipoet Cultuur Maatschappij). Of course, in a world with imperfect market information, stock prices will never 467 reflect the real value of invested capital at any particular moment in time, but by 468 using monthly data of capital gains and dividend yields over a 20-year time period 469 we ensure the inclusion of sufficient points of comparison to make reliable 470 calculations of investment performances, evening out short-run market volatility. 471 Although we report figures for the whole period of 1919-1938, we also show shorter 472 sub-periods to indicate how sensitive results can be to yearly fluctuations (another 473 factor that has burdened previous studies). For the sake of comparison we will 474 present geometric and arithmetic average returns, but given the volatility of the 475 price data we use the geometric mean (GM) for our historical interpretation. 476 We calculated Laspeyres' market-capitalisation weighted price and return indices 477 by linking monthly returns in a chain index. This index reflects the value of an 478 investment of BEF 100 in all stocks at the beginning of the indicated period and is 479 adjusted on a monthly basis through reinvestment in all stocks available during the 480 next period. The total return index at the end of the period reflects the end value of 481 an investment made in stocks. As dividends were partly paid in Dutch guilders we 482 converted dividends into BEF (as stock prices were quoted in BEF only), using the 483 exchange rates published in the official lists. Based upon these indices, periodic 484 rates of return can be calculated for any desired period. In mathematical terms the 485 indices are constructed as follows:
! 487 487 where I t denotes the value of the index at the end of period t where w it-1 is the 488 weight attached to stock i, L t-1 the number of stocks at the end of period (month) 489 t -1, and r it the return of stock i, including paid dividends (if there were any). We 490 set I equal to 100 at the beginning of each period. Our weights refer to relative 491 market capitalisations:
493 493 where P jt-1 is the price of stock j at t -1 and N jt-1 is the number of stocks for stock 494 j at t -1. 495
The DMS method includes some other widely accepted principles in finance. 496 First, total returns are calculated under the assumption that investors reinvest 497 dividends at ex-dividend day. Second, all necessary adjustments for capital 498 operations are made (stock splits, bonus shares, reverse splits, attribution and 499 inscription rights). Third, we include common stocks only, excluding 'special' types 500 of stocks granting exclusive voting rights and dividend privileges to an elite group 501 of shareholders. We get back to this latter point in Sect. 7. Figure 3 505 compares the real price index of the Netherlands Indies (Fig. 2) with the all share 506 stock price index of the BSE (31/12/1918 = 100), which serves as a proxy of price 507 trends on the major European stock markets. 508 Figures 1 and 2 show the enormous gap between the nominal stock price index 509 and the real (inflation-adjusted) stock price index. The gap rose to a factor 3.5 510 within a decade after 1916 and when considering the full period 1916-1940 nominal 511 capital gains went up from 100 to 668, while real capital gains rose to 147. The real 512 price index presented in Fig. 2 clearly reflects the upturn of the world economy 513 during the 1920s, followed by the worldwide collapse of stock markets during the 514 late 1920s, the period of depression in the early 1930s and the subsequent recovery 515 of world markets. Following on this point, it should be noted that the real stock price 516 index deviated from the European trend (as proxied by the BSE index) in a few 517 important respects. Figure 3 shows that the price index of colonial companies was 518 more volatile, with higher peaks and deeper troughs. The larger degree of 519 diversification in the BSE all shares index has a dampening effect on price shocks. 520 But the higher volatility also reflects the more volatile world market conditions for 521 agricultural commodities, and tropical cash-crops in particular. The stock prices of 522 the colonial companies started to rise earlier and more spectacularly than the BSE 523 index in the 1920s, but underwent a major correction in 1927, long before the 524 collapse associated with the international stock market crash of 1929. The recovery As rubber trees have to be planted years before they reach maturity, the risk of 546 serious over-or under-production in this sector is inherently large. Prices for rubber 547 went down from about 27.5 pence per pound in 1918 to 10.5 pence in 1921, 548 reaching a low of 6.75 pence on the 30th of August 1922. This price collapse raised 549 the call for the implementation of production and export restriction schemes 550 (Hexner 1946, 280-293). As the Dutch refused to comply with the Stephenson 551 restriction scheme initiated by the British in 1922, the Netherlands Indies were in a 552 good position to 'free ride' and raise production. Indonesian exports rose from 553 103,000 t in 1922 to 228,000 t in 1928 (Allen and Donnithorne (1962) [1954] , 123). 554
However, the rising rubber prices also provoked serious frictions with the main 555 consumer, US industries, who severely contested the restriction scheme (Forbin 556 1943, 155; Brandes 1962) . As a result, American companies scaled up their 557 investments in rubber plantations during the 1920s, for instance in Brazil (by Ford), 558 in Liberia (Firestone), in the Philippines (Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company) and 559 also in the Netherlands Indies (US Tyre Company). The expansion in rubber 560 production capacity resulted in huge oversupplies when the market for rubber 561 weakened in the late 1920s. In 1928 when the Stephenson plan was ended, the prices 562 were already in decline, but of an average price of 10 pence in 1929 barely 2 563 pence was left in 1932 (Forbin 1943, 88 1919-1928, 1929-1938, 1939-1948 and 1949-1958 . The first 589 decade captures the 'roaring' twenties, the second decade captures the great 590 depression and its aftermath. The third decade captures the war years, including the 
